This paper analyzes the possible response f rom Asian developing countries (ADC) to the proposal for the formation of an international legal entity called World Environmental Organization (WEO) designed to facilitate the internalization of global environmental externalities. We argue that the WEO m ust recognize the fundamental indivisibility of the economic growth-environment agenda in these countries. If suitable side payments in the shape of tariff concessions, relaxation of non tariff barriers and transfers of technology and cash are made and the WEO is seen to be relevant to the environmental problems of ADC, they may well participate in such a venture. 
Introduction:
This paper analyzes the possible response from Asian developing countries (ADC) to the proposal for the formation of a n international legal entity called World Environmental Organization (WEO). WEO has found mention in various forums 2 . We conceive of a WEO based on the principle of internalization of global external effects (Whalley and Zissimos (2000) ), not the adoption of standards 3 , as was the case in efforts like Agenda 21. Consonant with this, we focus on the twin issues of demarcation of property rights and side payments in order to facilitate Coasian deals.
ADC response to WEO would be based on their priorities. They rank economic growth above domestic environmental problems (DEP), followed by global environmental problems (GEP) and consider an uncritical emphasis on GEP as imposition of a "Northern Agenda". ADC view with suspicion Northern claims about global rights over a clean atmosphere as undermining ADC's "natural sovereign" rights over their resources. To succeed, any potential WEO needs the support of ADC. However, because of the immense diversity of ADC, a non-differentiated ADC view on environmental problems is unlikely. It is possible, however, to sketch the broad contours of an ADC perspective, some of which may apply more generally among LDCs, and constitute what may be termed the "southern agenda".
Growing concern about GEP has led to a patchwork quilt of some 200 multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) ranging from non-binding ones to those with binding 2 The WTO Director-General while inaugurating the WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and the Environment on 15 March 1999, called for the creation of a World Environmental Organization as an institutional and legal counterpart to the WTO. 3 Whalley and Zissimos (2000) examine various forms of the WEO proposals ranging from merely a meeting place and a clearinghouse (WEO-I) to a strong body, which formulates and enforces rules and policies, (WEO-III).
3 commitments on instruments and emission levels, cover transnational pollutants, process and product standards and bio-diversity through regional t o global agreements, and encompass property rights type agreements to joint emission reduction. Most involve narrow area negotiation without side payments and reflect environmental concerns of developed countries (DC) with few, if any, inter developing country treaties. Some admit positive and negative sanctions. Sovereign states sign MEA, although GEP often apply to undefined jurisdictions (such as international waters or airspace).
There are four problems with existing MEA: (i) cross-MEA interdependencies are ignored;
(ii) bargaining opportunities, wherein side payments to some parties could be used in exchange for enhanced bargaining opportunities and greater compliance, are not admitted;
(iii) issue linkages 4 are ruled out; and (iv) many MEA directly or indirectly contradict existing international agreements on trade and capital flows. (WTO (1999) ). There is a "prisoners' dilemma" type problem since those paying and beneficiaries may not coincide.
There may be a role for an international institution to address these shortcomings.
Institutions addressing the global nature of trade and capital flows (such as the World Bank, the IMF and now the WTO) evolved when environmental interdependencies were seen as unimportant. Recent rounds of GATT negotiations have permitted environmental and other concerns 5 as basis for departure from free trade. In ADC these provisions are viewed as another way of imposing non-tariff barriers (NTB) on their exports.
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The bulk of the environmental assets of the world (forest cover (sinks for CO2 emissions) and biodiversity) lie in LDCs (including ADC), whereas concern for a global treaty comes from DC. ADC can demand side payments in terms of better deals in trade arrangements and cash to compensate them for environmental restraint. There might even be leverage for other concessions, e.g., tackling domestic environmental problems of ADC.
ADC response to the idea of WEO would be determined by how WEO fits in with their current environmental and growth priorities; perceived costs and benefits of joining; and expectations from WEO in light of experience with MEA and the evolving path of WEO credibility 6 . Section 3 addresses these issues. Section 2 examines socioeconomic characteristics and environmental concerns of ADC. Section 4 concludes. GEP could become a serious concern for ADC. Global warming leading to rising sea levels, may submerge many islands in the Asia Pacific, or increase flooding in Bangladesh. Many ADC are dependent upon their biodiversity for agricultural operations. Even CO2 emissions could become important for ADC. There is a need to effectively articulate this potential importance.
Socioeconomic and Environmental Profile of ADC
We present three indicators of ADC contribution GEP. First, average annual rates of deforestation are high, leading to land degradation. (Table 4 ). Some countries with high forest cover (Indonesia, Thailand) are under pressure from large external debts to export more (including timber). Of the 1.9 billion hectares affected by soil degradation worldwide, the 8 The fact that WEO would primarily be concerned with GEP does not mean that it should completely ignore 6 largest area (850 million hectares) is in Asia.
(WRI/UNEP/UNDP/WB (1996)).
Deforestation induced water run-off erosion of soil accounts for over 61 % of the land degradation in the region (FAO/UNDP/UNEP (1994)). This is ominous for the future of food security in the area.
Second, ADC biodiversity is threatened (Table 5) Third, DC account for more than half the CO2 emissions. China and India have low per capita but high absolute CO2 emissions, which are expected to rise sharply. During 1990-97 DEP. 9 Asia contains three of the world's eight biogeographic realms including the highest (and longest) mountain system, the second largest rainforest complex, and more than 1/2 the coral reefs. Five of the twelve "mega diversity" countries are in this region (McNeeley et. al. (1990) ). Asia encompasses 2/3 of the world's flora and more than 10 % of the world's fauna. ADC depend heavily on direct harvesting from nature. Destruction of biodiversity will adversely affect employment.
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ADC CO2 emission growth (total as well as per capita) have been above world average 11 (Table 6 ).
3. An ADC response to WEO ADC would not object to a weak version of WEO (WEO-I). However, this may not be enough to make a serious dent on GEP. Many ADC might initially be unenthusiastic about a more effective stronger version. Public support within the ADC 12 for WEO would be forthcoming if WEO also addressed (even indirectly) some specific ADC problems. (Jha and Whalley (2000)).
Many DEP of ADC are really policy failures i n other sectors. Subsidized fertilizers and pesticides lead to their excessive use, increasing soil degradation and salinity. Water subsidies result in depletion of water table and desertification and fuel subsidies to overuse of vehicles and traffic-related problems. Many laws have a colonial legacy, wherein the government had the sole rights to the produce of the forests and fisheries, with management suffering from inadequate personnel, lax implementation of laws, and a generally anti-people stance. For the WEO to be relevant 13 to these problems it would need to facilitate (i) harmonization of tax and subsidy policies, and (ii) urban planning so that relative prices of goods reflect environmental priorities and relative scarcities through, say, full marginal cost pricing. Since tampering with the price mechanism is a common redistributive measure in many ADC, such policy might entail some short-run hardships for the poor, to address which 11 Transboundary air pollution -burning of poor quality coal, accumulation of fly ash and slash-and-burn agriculture-is common in many ADC. 12 Trade policies immediately affect certain groups (exporters, for example), thus there are predictable lobbying efforts. Reducing deforestation has more diffused benefits and hence needs wide-based support. 13 To quote WTO (1999) ADC, have little incentive to reduce CFC. India, for instance, exports 75% of its CFC output and domestic demand is rising because of the use of refrigeration by a large middle class.
14 Direct and targeted subsidies reach the poor more effectively than does generalized tampering with the price mechanism. (van Stuijvenberg (1996) ). 15 Examples include GATT agreement on intellectual property rights, labor standards and the social clause.
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There is little domestic pressure to switch to "greener" technologies. Hence, ADC will be wary of WEO.
Costs to ADC of reducing CO2 emissions are high. Parikh, et. al. (1995) for India and Zhang (1998) for China compute the costs of a 20 to 30 % reduction in CO2 to be between 2 to 3 percent of respective potential GDPs. Expecting such large sacrifices from such poor countries seems not only wrong but also impractical.
However, not joining a coalition aimed at controlling CO2 also has costs. China and India would gain by joining a coalition controlling carbon emission at 1990 level over a 100-year horizon. (Xepapadeas and Yiannanka (1997) 
4.Conclusions
GEP are pressing concerns and call for innovative institutional design to address them. Rich countries consider GEP as an emergent issue; even ADC will soon become major contributors. Whereas DC value the international environment highly, the ADC rank economic growth and DEP above GEP, although not addressing GEP could hurt in specific areas. But, the fundamental indivisibility of the growth and environmental agendas in the ADC has to be faced.
Given global concern over GEP, the global community should have the foresight to conclude a treaty at an early date. This would necessitate incentive design to persuade ADC to join WEO negotiations and remain committed to this process.
Since ADC have considerable environmental assets, they should look for coupling restraint i n the area of GEP to other areas of their linkage with DC, including tariff and NTB concessions, transfer of technology and direct transfers. Given the wide range of such linkages it would be necessary to exploit associated positive externalities.
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A weak version of WEO would be innocuous enough and, therefore, acceptable but not very effective. Stronger versions would be unacceptable to ADC unless issue linkage is permitted.
Given past experience of ADC with MEA, WEO would have to build credibility as an organization that is truly interested in GEP, is sensitive to the needs of the ADC and is not acting as a conduit for imposing the will of the DC on the ADC. This is a challenging task. But there seems scope for achieving it. 
India
Deforestation; soil erosion; overgrazing; desertification; air pollution from industrial effluents and vehicle emissions; water pollution from raw sewage and runoff of agricultural pesticides; tap water is not potable throughout the country; huge and rapidly growing population is overstraining natural resources.
Iran
Air pollution in urban areas, from vehicle emissions, refinery operations, and industrial effluents; deforestation; overgrazing; desertification; oil pollution in the Persian Gulf; inadequate supplies of potable water natural hazards: periodic droughts, floods; dust storms, sandstorms; earthquakes along the Western border. Pakistan
Water pollution from raw sewage, industrial wastes, and agricultural runoff; limited natural fresh water resources; poor access to potable water; deforestation; soil erosion; desertification, natural hazards: frequent earthquakes, occasionally severe especially in north and west; flooding of Indus after heavy rains (July and August).
Bangladesh Landless people forced to live on and cultivate flood-prone land; limited access to potable water; water-borne diseases prevalent; water pollution especially of fishing areas from the use of commercial pesticides; intermittent water shortages because of falling water tables in the northern and central parts of the country; soil degradation; deforestation; severe overpopulation.
Bhutan Soil erosion; limited access to potable water. Sri Lanka Deforestation; soil erosion; wildlife populations threatened by poaching; coastal degradation from mining activities and increased pollution; freshwater resources being polluted by industrial wastes and sewage runoff natural hazards: occasional cyclones and tornadoes.
Nepal Almost total dependence on wood for fuel and cutting down trees to expand agricultural land resulting in widespread deforestation; soil erosion; water pollution (use of contaminated water presents human health risks). Hong Kong Air and water pollution from rapid urbanization. Singapore Industrial pollution; limited natural fresh water resources; limited land availability, waste disposal problems; seasonal smoke/haze resulting from forest fires in Indonesia. Taiwan Air pollution; water pollution from industrial emissions, raw sewage; contamination of drinking water supplies; trade in endangered species; low-level radioactive waste disposal. South Korea Air pollution in large cities; water pollution from the discharge of sewage and industrial effluents; drift net fishing. North Korea Localized air pollution attributable to inadequate industrial controls; water pollution; inadequate supplies of potable water. Thailand Air pollution from vehicle emissions; water pollution from organic and factory wastes; deforestation; soil erosion; wildlife populations threatened by illegal hunting. Malaysia Air pollution from industrial and vehicular emissions; water pollution from raw sewage; deforestation; smoke/haze from Indonesian forest fires. Indonesia Deforestation; water pollution from industrial wastes, sewage; air pollution in urban areas.
Vietnam
Logging and slash-and-burn agricultural practices contribute to deforestation and soil degradation; water pollution and overfishing threaten marine life populations; groundwater contamination limits potable water supply; growing urban industrialization and population migration are rapidly degrading environment in Hanoi and Ho Chi Min City.
Philippines
Uncontrolled deforestation in watershed areas; soil erosion; air and water pollution in Manila; increasing pollution of coastal mangrove swamps which are important fish breeding grounds.
China
Air pollution (greenhouse gases, particulates) from the overwhelming use of high-sulfur coal as a fuel, produces acid rain which is damaging forests; water shortages experienced throughout the country, particularly in urban areas and in the north; future growth in water usage threatens to outpace supplies; water pollution from industrial effluents; much of the population does not have access to potable water; less than 10% of sewage receives treatment; deforestation; estimated loss of one-fifth of agricultural land since 1949 to soil erosion and economic development; desertification; trade in endangered species.
Source: World Factbook 1997, CIA Deardorff and Stern (1998) .
